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ABSTRACT 
In Sturgeon v. Frost, the Supreme Court addressed the status of navigable 
waters in Alaska’s conservation system units. In holding that these waters are 
not “public lands” for the purposes of ANILCA, the Court limited the ability 
of the federal government to regulate them. In a footnote, Sturgeon preserved 
the longstanding Katie John trilogy of Ninth Circuit precedent regarding 
subsistence rights. This new jurisdictional framework has the potential to cause 
problems for subsistence management in Alaska. This Note addresses these 
potential consequences and proposes possible steps to create a more harmonized 
subsistence management system through greater cooperation between the 
federal government, the State, and subsistence users. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
On March 26, 2019, the Supreme Court issued its unanimous opinion 
in Sturgeon v. Frost (Sturgeon II).1 The Court held that the National Parks 
Service (NPS) did not have the authority to regulate navigable waters in 
Alaska’s conservation system units (CSUs).2 This decision concludes the 
latest battle in a decades long jurisdictional turf war over who controls 
Alaska CSUs, the State of Alaska or the federal government. The front line 
of this war has traditionally been the management of Alaskan natural 
resources for subsistence harvest. Caught in the crossfire are Alaska 
Natives, many of whom depend on subsistence lifestyles.3 
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 1.  139 S. Ct. 1066 (2019). 
 2.  Id. at 1085.  
 3.  Miranda Strong, Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act Compliance 
& Nonsubsistence Areas: How Can Alaska Thaw out Rural & Alaska Native Subsistence 
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While the Court attempted to dodge the subsistence issue in Sturgeon 
II, its decision magnifies the battle lines. The question of Alaskan 
subsistence management remains open, and the next moves by each party 
will be critical. The first part of this Note situates Sturgeon II in the 
statutory and judicial history of subsistence in Alaska. The following 
discussion introduces the Sturgeon decisions and considers the possible 
impact of Sturgeon II on subsistence management. The final part proposes 
a truce in the subsistence jurisdiction wars, suggesting that Sturgeon II 
might present new avenues for federal-state cooperation and the further 
recognition of Alaska Native interests. This discussion includes two 
proposals for policy change in response to the Court’s decision: 1) 
increased cooperation through cooperative management plans, the 
Alaska Land Use Council, and memoranda of understanding, and 2) a 
state constitutional amendment recognizing rural subsistence rights. 
II. BACKGROUND 
A. Factual Background 
In 2007, John Sturgeon was navigating the Nation River on his 
hovercraft,4 traveling to his preferred moose hunting grounds.5 National 
Parks Service (NPS) agents arrived and informed him that NPS 
regulations prohibited the operation of hovercrafts in the Yukon-Charley 
Rivers National Preserve.6 Sturgeon returned home empty-handed but 
did not resign himself to the NPS regulations. Instead, he launched 
litigation that spanned more than a decade and resulted in two trips to 
the highest court in the land. 
B. Statutory Background 
1. ANILCA § 103(c) 
Sturgeon’s desire to operate his hovercraft in the Yukon-Charley 
preserve implicated a fundamental question about who has the authority 
to regulate the navigable waters located in Alaska’s CSUs. The answer to 
this question lies within the law that created Alaska’s CSUs, the Alaska 
National Interest Lands Conservation Act (ANILCA).7 However, 
ANILCA is far from a model of clarity on this point. Section 103(c) states: 
 
Rights?, 30 ALASKA L. REV. 71, 73 (2013).  
 4.  Sturgeon v. Frost, 136 S. Ct. 1061, 1062 (2016).  
 5.  Id. at 1064.  
 6.  Id. at 1062.  
 7.  Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act, Pub. L. No. 96-487, 94 
Stat. 2371 (1980) (codified at 16 U.S.C. § 3101–3233. (2018)) [hereinafter ANILCA].  
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Only those lands within the boundaries of any conservation 
system unit which are public lands (as such term is defined in 
this Act) shall be deemed to be included as a portion of such unit. 
No lands which, before, on, or after [the date of ANILCA’s 
enactment], are conveyed to the State, to any Native 
Corporation, or to any private party shall be subject to the 
regulations applicable solely to public lands within such units. 
If the State, a Native Corporation, or other owner desires to 
convey any such lands, the Secretary may acquire such lands in 
accordance with applicable law (including this Act), and any 
such lands shall become part of the unit, and be administered 
accordingly.8 
The Act defines “land” as “lands, waters, or interests therein.”9 “Public 
lands” are defined as “land situated in Alaska which, [after the date of 
ANILCA’s enactment] are Federal lands . . . .”10 Finally, “Federal land[s]” 
under ANILCA are “lands the title to which is in the United States after 
[the date of ANILCA’s enactment].”11 
To summarize, public lands for the purposes of ANILCA are lands 
to which the United States had title on December 2, 1980, when ANILCA 
was enacted, as well as lands within CSUs acquired by the federal 
government after that date. Only these “public lands” are “subject to the 
regulations applicable solely to public lands within such units.”12 As a 
practical matter, this section refers to NPS regulations. Other federal 
regulations, for instance those issued by the EPA, are of general 
applicability to both public and private lands, removing them from 
103(c)’s purview. At first blush, this provision may seem trivial, but its 
importance is highlighted by the presence of vast “inholdings”13 within 
Alaska CSUs. Much of the land that falls within the boundaries of the 
CSUs in Alaska is owned privately or by Alaskan Native corporations. 
These inholdings are more prevalent in Alaska than elsewhere because in 
ANILCA Congress chose to follow topographic or natural features rather 
than property lines.14 Without section 103(c), these inholdings would be 
 
 8.  Id. § 103(c), 94 Stat. 2371, 2377.  
 9.  Id. § 102(1), 94 Stat. at 2375.  
 10.  Id. § 102(3). This section contains an exception for federal lands that had 
been selected by Native Alaskan corporations but had not yet been transferred. 
This exception is not material in Sturgeon’s case.  
 11.  Id. § 102(2). 
 12.  Id. § 103(c).  
 13.  Inholdings are pockets of privately owned land within the boundaries of 
a federally designated national park, monument, or wilderness. Randy Tanner, 
Inholdings within Wilderness: Legal Foundations, Problems, and Solutions, 8 INT’L J. 
WILDERNESS 9, 9 (2002).  
 14.  See ANILCA § 103(b) (“Whenever possible boundaries shall follow 
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subject to NPS regulations along with all of the federally owned land in 
the CSU. 
2. The History of ANILCA 
ANILCA resulted from years of legislative wrangling over the fate 
of Alaska’s undeveloped land. The battle that led to ANILCA began with 
the passage of the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act (ANSCA).15 
Section 17(d)(2) of ANSCA resulted from an amendment proposed by 
Nevada Senator Alan Bible with the support of conservationists.16 Section 
17(d)(2) authorized the Secretary of the Interior to reserve up to eighty 
million acres of land in Alaska for inclusion in the national park, forest, 
wildlife refuge, and wild and scenic rivers systems.17 However, Congress 
had the final authority to approve the withdrawals authorized by § 
17(d)(2).18 Congress was required to act in response to the Secretary’s 
proposed withdrawals before December 28, 1978.19 As the deadline 
approached, Congress had not acted on the Secretary’s 
recommendations.20 Further, the State of Alaska had selected nine to 
eleven million acres located in the proposed section 17(d)(2) areas under 
their Alaska Statehood Act21 entitlement.22 In response, President Carter 
exercised his authority under the Antiquities Act of 190623 to create 
seventeen new national monuments totaling fifty-six million acres located 
in the section 17(d)(2) recommended areas.24 Carter also used his Federal 
Land Policy and Management Act25 authority to reserve more land in 
Alaska.26 In total, the President’s reservations exceeded 100 million 
 
hydrographic divides or embrace other topographic or natural features.”). 
 15.  Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act, Pub. L. No. 92-203, 85 Stat. 688 
(1971) (codified at 43 U.S.C. §§ 1601–1629 (2018)).  
 16.  G. FRANK WILLISS, “DO THINGS RIGHT THE FIRST TIME”: ADMINISTRATIVE 
HISTORY THE NATIONAL PARKS SERVICE AND THE ALASKA NATIONAL INTEREST LANDS 
CONSERVATION ACT OF 1980 Chapter 2 Section C (1985) (ebook).  
 17.  CLAUS-M NASKE & HERMAN E. SLOTNICK, ALASKA, A HISTORY OF THE 49TH 
STATE 225 (1987).  
 18.  Id. 
 19.  David Aaron Funk, The Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act 
and the National Parks Service: A Primer on Access 2 (June 1990) (unpublished 
Master’s thesis, University of Oregon) http://www.npshistory.com/ 
publications/anilca-nps-primer.pdf. 
 20.  WALTER R. BORNEMAN, ALASKA SAGA: OF A BOLD LAND 504 (2003).  
 21.  Alaska Statehood Act, Pub. L. No. 85-508, 72 Stat. 339 (1958). 
 22.  DANIEL NELSON, NORTHERN LANDSCAPES: THE STRUGGLE FOR WILDERNESS 
ALASKA 220 (2004). 
 23.  Antiquities Act of 1906, Pub. L. No. 59-209, 34 Stat. 225 (codified at 54 
U.S.C. § 3203 et seq.).  
 24.  BORNEMAN, supra note 20, at 504.  
 25.  Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976, Pub L. No. 94-579, 90 
Stat. 2743 (codified at 43 U.S.C. § 1701 et seq.).  
 26.  Funk, supra note 19, at Chapter 4 Section E.  
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acres.27 
The Carter land reservations sparked political controversy in Alaska 
and set the stage for ANILCA’s passage.28 Like the debates over ANSCA, 
the legislative process leading to ANILCA pitted conservationists and 
pro-development forces against each other.29 Alaska Native interests 
were also determined to ensure that their rights were protected.30 
Ultimately, ANILCA is a compromise statute, balancing conservation, 
development, and subsistence use of Alaska’s lands.31 
III. KATIE JOHN AND SUBSISTENCE MANAGEMENT IN ALASKA 
The Sturgeon cases unfolded against the backdrop of Alaska’s 
complex subsistence management history. In fact, the Sturgeon question 
was not new. The Ninth Circuit had addressed the § 103(c) question 
several times in a series of cases collectively known as the Katie John 
trilogy. These decisions set the parameters of a patchwork state-federal 
subsistence management system that took center stage in the Sturgeon 
controversy. At a fundamental level, the Katie John decisions called upon 
courts to consider some finer points of federal water law and their bearing 
on the word “title” in ANILCA. 
A. Federal Water Law 
Understanding the holdings in Katie John and Sturgeon requires some 
grasp of federal water law. In particular, the Equal Footing Doctrine, the 
reserved water doctrine, and the navigational servitude loom large in the 
section 103(c) controversy. 
1. Equal Footing Doctrine 
The Equal Footing Doctrine states that when a new state enters the 
union it has the same rights and powers as the existing states.32 The exact 
phrase “equal footing” has appeared in every act admitting a new state 
since the addition of Tennessee in 1796.33 However, this language does 
 
 27.  BORNEMAN, supra note 20.  
 28.  Id. at 505.  
 29.  Id.; see also NELSON, supra note 22, at 247–48.  
 30.  James D. Linxwiler & Joseph J. Perkins, A Primer on Alaska Lands, 61 ROCKY 
MTN. MIN. L. INST. 7-37 (2015).  
 31.  See NASKE & SLOTNICK, supra note 17, at 234–37 (documenting the interests 
driving the passage of ANILCA and continuing controversies); see also Linxwiler 
& Joseph, supra note 30 at 7-33–7-34.  
 32.  See Coyle v. Smith, 221 U.S. 559, 573 (1911) (“[W]hen a new State is 
admitted to the Union, it is so admitted with all of the powers of sovereignty and 
jurisdiction which pertain to the original states . . . .”).  
 33.  John Hanna, Equal Footing in the Admission of States, 3 BAYLOR L. REV. 519, 
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not do much work on its own; the heart of the doctrine comes from Article 
IV Section 3 of the Constitution, which says “[n]ew states may be 
admitted by the Congress into this union.”34 From there, the Constitution 
defines how these new states will relate to each other and the federal 
government.35 
The Equal Footing Doctrine is important in the context of water 
rights primarily because of the Submerged Lands Act,36 which gives states 
title to the land below navigable waters within their borders.37 When 
Alaska became a state, it gained title to its submerged lands, except those 
specifically reserved by the federal government.38 
2. Federal Reserved Water Rights 
 The federal reserved water rights doctrine found its first expression 
in Winters v. United States.39 Winters involved the water rights of the Fort 
Belknap Indian Reservation, located on the Milk River in Montana.40 
Conflict arose because diversions upriver from the reservation threatened 
to deprive it of water.41 The Court protected the reservation’s water rights 
from these intrusions; it held that when the United States created the 
reservation and set it aside to be habitable and arable, it reserved the 
water necessary to accomplish that purpose.42 In other words, the right to 
water was “intrinsic to the purpose of the reservation in general.”43 
Importantly, the Winters court rejected Montana’s Equal Footing Doctrine 
argument that the state gained control over the waters when it entered 
the union.44 Therefore, the states’ jurisdiction over submerged lands has 
 
523 (1951).  
 34.  U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3.  
 35.  Hanna, supra note 33, at 522. 
 36.  Submerged Lands Act, Pub. L. No. 83-31, 67 Stat. 29 (1953) (codified at 43 
U.S.C. § 1301 et seq.).  
 37.  Id.  
 38.  United States v. Alaska, 521 U.S. 1, 32–33 (1997).  
 39.  207 U.S. 564 (1907).  
 40.  Barbara Cosens, The Legacy of Winters v. United States and the Winters 
Doctrine, One Hundred Years Later 6–7, in THE FUTURE OF INDIAN AND FEDERAL 
RESERVED WATER RIGHTS: THE WINTERS CENTENNIAL (Barbara Cosens & Judith V. 
Royster eds. 2012).  
 41.  Id. at 7. 
 42.  Winters, 207 U.S. at 576–77.  
 43.  Richard Monette, One Hundred Years After Winters: The Immovable Object 
of Tribes’ Reserved Water Rights Meets the Irresistible Force of States’ Reserved Rights 
Under the Equal Footing Doctrine 114, in THE FUTURE OF INDIAN AND RESERVED 
WATER RIGHTS: THE WINTERS CENTENNIAL (Barbara Cosens & Judith V. Royster eds. 
2012).  
 44.  Winters, 207 U.S. at 577 (“The power of the government to reserve the 
waters and exempt them from appropriation under the state laws is not denied 
. . . .”). 
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no bearing on the federal government’s ability to reserve water rights.45 
The Court has refined the reserved water rights doctrine over the 
years, but its basic structure remains the same. For instance, in Cappaert v. 
United States,46 the court applied the doctrine to preserve Devil’s Hole, a 
subterranean pool in the Death Valley National Monument.47 The Court 
said that “when the Federal Government withdraws its land from the 
public domain and reserves it for a federal purpose, the Government, by 
implication, reserves appurtenant water then unappropriated to the 
extent needed to accomplish the purpose of the reservation.”48 
3. Navigational Servitude 
The navigational servitude allows the government to use navigable 
waters for purposes related to navigation and commerce and preserve 
navigable waters for those purposes.49 The navigational servitude derives 
from the Commerce power50 and has roots in English common law.51 The 
servitude represents a public right of use.52 As such, the navigational 
servitude does not convey ownership of any land or waters.53 
B. The Katie John Decisions 
1. Katie John I 
When Sturgeon’s challenge to the NPS hovercraft ban reached the 
Ninth Circuit, the panel heard the case against the backdrop of similar 
cases that applied ANILCA § 103(c) in the context of subsistence 
management. Each of these cases involved the same plaintiff, Katie John, 
a respected Athabascan elder and advocate for subsistence rights.54 
Alaska v. Babbitt55 (Katie John I) involved the rights of Ahtna 
Athabascan Alaska Natives to continue subsistence fishing at the 
Batzulnetas fishery near the confluence of Tanada Creek and the Copper 
 
 45.  Id.; for a more complete discussion of the relationship between reserved 
water rights and the Equal Footing Doctrine, see Monette, supra note 43.  
 46.  426 U.S. 128 (1976).  
 47.  Id. at 138.  
 48.  Id. 
 49.  Genevieve Pisarski, Testing the Limits of the Federal Navigational Servitude, 
2 OCEAN & COASTAL L.J. 313, 313 (1997).  
 50.  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.  
 51.  RALPH J. GILLIS, NAVIGATIONAL SERVITUDES: SOURCES, APPLICATIONS, 
PARADIGMS 3 (2007).  
 52.  Id. at 2.  
 53.  City of Angoon v. Hodel, 803 F.2d 1016, 1027 n.6 (9th Cir. 1986).  
 54.  Julie Stricker, Athabascan elder Katie John receives honorary doctorate, 
FAIRBANKS DAILY NEWS-MINER (May 14, 2011), http://www.newsminer.com/ 
news/local_news/athabascan-elder-katie-john-receives-honorary-
doctorate/article_df8d9ec6-383c-59e7-9bd6-592ce5d8357c.html.  
 55.  72 F.3d 698 (9th Cir. 1995).  
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River in Wrangell-St. Elias National Park.56 With the passage of ANSCA, 
Congress extinguished aboriginal fishing rights.57 However, ANILCA 
gave priority to rural residents to engage in subsistence uses such as 
hunting and fishing on “public lands.”58 In administering this part of 
ANILCA, the Secretary of the Interior adopted a regulatory definition of 
public lands that excluded navigable waters.59 Katie John challenged this 
definition because it limited the ability of Mentasa village residents to use 
the Batzulnetas fishery.60 
The question at the heart of Katie John I is the same as the 
fundamental question presented in the Sturgeon II case: what is the 
meaning of “public lands” under ANILCA and are navigable waters 
included in that definition? In Katie John I the district court agreed with 
the plaintiffs in holding that the navigational servitude brought navigable 
waters within the scope of “public lands.”61 This holding was based on 
the premise that the navigable servitude amounts to ownership of an 
interest in navigable waters.62 The district court was also concerned with 
the policy consequences of interpreting “public lands” narrowly, 
excluding navigable waters that offer some of the best opportunities for 
subsistence fishing.63 
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit upheld the district court’s ruling in 
favor of Katie John but disagreed with the district court’s reasoning.64 The 
circuit court rejected the idea that the navigational servitude gave the 
United States “title” to an “interest” in navigable waters.65 The court 
found this interpretation to contradict an earlier ANILCA case, City of 
Angoon v. Hodel,66 which held that the navigational servitude does not 
 
 56.  Id. at 699–700.  
 57.  43 U.S.C. § 1603(b) (2012).  
 58.  ANILCA § 804, 94 Stat. at 2423 (“Except as otherwise provided in this Act 
and other Federal laws, the taking on public lands of fish and wildlife for 
nonwasteful subsistence uses shall be accorded priority over the taking on such 
lands of fish and wildlife for other purposes.”).  
 59.  Babbitt, 72 F.3d at 701. 
 60.  Id.  
 61.  John v. United States, No. A90-0484-CV (HRH), 1994 WL 487830, at *18 
(D. Alaska Mar. 30, 1994).  
 62.  See id. at *17 (“[T]he United States may be considered to own an ‘interest’ 
in property by virtue of the navigational servitude. The court concludes that, for 
purposes of Title VIII of ANILCA, the United States holds title to an interest in the 
navigable waters of Alaska.”). [R4.1] 
 63.  See id. at *18 (“By limiting the scope of Title VIII to non-navigable 
waterways, the Secretary has, to a large degree, thwarted Congress’ intent to 
provide the opportunity for rural residents engaged in a subsistence way of life to 
continue to do so.”).  
 64.  Babbitt, 72 F.3d at 704.  
 65.  Id. at 703.  
 66.  803 F.2d 1016 (9th Cir. 1986).  
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give the United States title to navigable waters.67 Instead, the court found 
that the federal reserved water rights doctrine was a more appropriate 
avenue saying, “By virtue of its reserved water rights, the United States 
has interests in some navigable waters. Consequently, public lands 
subject to subsistence management under ANILCA include certain 
navigable waters.”68 
The court employed two disparate approaches to judicial 
interpretation in coming to its conclusion in Katie John I. First, the court 
rejected the district court’s navigational servitude approach on textualist 
grounds, giving weight to the fact that the United States does not hold 
“title” to that interest.69 However, the court did not seem concerned with 
the question of whether the United States holds title to its interest derived 
from the federal reserved waters doctrine.70 Here, the court recognizes its 
more functionalist approach: “If we were to adopt the state’s position, that 
public lands exclude navigable waters, we would give meaning to the 
term ‘title’ in the definition of the phrase ‘public lands.’ But we would 
undermine congressional intent to protect and provide the opportunity 
for subsistence fishing.”71 The court gives meaning to the word title in one 
part of the opinion while minimizing its importance in another. To their 
credit, the court faced an exceptionally difficult task and “recognize[d] 
that [its] holding may be inherently unsatisfactory.”72 
2. Katie John II 
Katie John I did not settle the issue. After the district court issued a 
ruling on remand consistent with Katie John I, the Ninth Circuit took the 
unusual step of voting to hear the case en banc before a three-judge panel 
had an opportunity to review it.73 In John v. United States (Katie John II),74 
the en banc court affirmed the district court’s decision with a one-
paragraph opinion.75 This result effectively endorsed the holding in Katie 
John I. 
While the court adopted the Katie John I position, a concurring 
opinion by Judge Tallman laid out an alternative vision of how ANILCA 
 
 67.  See id. at 1027 n.6 (“Since the United States does not hold title to the 
navigational servitude, the servitude is not ‘public land’ within the meaning of 
ANILCA.”).  
 68.  Babbitt, 72 F.3d at 703–04.  
 69.  Id. at 702–03. 
 70.  Id. at 703–04.  
 71.  Id. at 704.  
 72.  Id. 
 73.  John v. United States, 216 F.3d 885, 886 (9th Cir. 2000) (granting en banc 
review).  
 74.  247 F.3d 1032 (9th Cir. 2001) (per curiam).  
 75.  Id. at 1033.  
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applies to navigable waters. Judge Tallman “[did] not believe Congress 
intended the reserved water rights doctrine to limit the scope of 
ANILCA’s subsistence priority.”76 Instead, he reasoned that Congress 
invoked its Commerce Clause power to protect subsistence fishing in 
Alaska.77 This interpretation relies in part on ANILCA’s declaration of 
findings.78 If Congress intended federal authority in ANILCA CSUs to be 
coextensive with the commerce power, the importance of the “title” 
analysis would be greatly reduced. Like the district court in Katie John I, 
Judge Tallman was concerned with the policy implications of removing 
navigable waters from the subsistence priority.79 His Commerce Clause 
approach represents a broad interpretation of the federal government’s 
authority to regulate under ANILCA. 
Representing the opposite end of the spectrum with respect to 
federal authority, Judge Kozinski authored a dissenting opinion. He 
started from the principle that “Alaska exercises sovereignty over the 
beds of its navigable waters . . . its power to control navigation, fishing 
and other public uses of the water above the beds is an incident of this 
sovereignty.”80 Judge Kozinski was unwilling to find that Congress 
intended to preempt that sovereignty without a “super-strong clear 
statement.”81 In his estimation, ANILCA did not offer a clear statement 
that the federal government intended to enter an area of traditional state 
sovereignty.82 
Judge Kozinski also used a textualist approach to arrive at what he 
thought to be the most tenable interpretation of ANILCA. He reasoned 
that since the federal reserved water doctrine does not grant “title” in the 
conventional sense, “the . . . reserved water right is simply not sufficient 
 
 76.  Id. at 1034 (Tallman, J., concurring). 
 77.  Id. at 1035 (Tallman, J., concurring) (citing 16 U.S.C. § 3111(4) (2012)).  
 78.  See ANILCA § 801(4), 94 Stat. at 2422 (“[I]n order to fulfill the policies and 
purposes of the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act and as a matter of equity, it 
is necessary for the Congress to invoke its constitutional authority over Native 
affairs and its constitutional authority under the property clause and the 
commerce clause . . . .”). 
 79.  See John, 247 F.3d at 1036 (Tallman, J., concurring) (“Given the crucial role 
that navigable waters play in traditional subsistence fishing, it defies common 
sense to conclude that, when Congress indicated an intent to protect traditional 
subsistence fishing, it meant only the limited subsistence fishing that occurs in 
non-navigable waters.”). 
 80.  Id. at 1044 (Kozinski, J., dissenting) (citing Utah Div. of State Lands v. 
United States, 482 U.S. 193, 195 (1987)). 
 81.  Id.  
 82.  See id. at 1050 (Kozinski, J., dissenting) (“[I]t is far from clear that Congress 
intended to take away the state’s traditional authority to control fishing in half of 
the state’s navigable waters, as the majority implicitly holds, or in all of the state’s 
navigable waters, as the concurrence would have it.”).  
JONES FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 4/29/2020  5:40 PM 
2019 THE IMPACT OF STURGEON II 231 
to turn waters subject to that right into public lands.”83 
While Katie John II affirmed the holding in Katie John I, it also 
highlighted the lack of unanimity behind that position amongst the en 
banc court. 
3. Katie John III 
The final chapter in the Katie John saga, John v. United States84 (Katie 
John III), involved a challenge to the 1999 rules promulgated by the 
Secretaries of Agriculture and the Interior implementing the ruling in 
Katie John I.85 Specifically, Katie John and others asserted that the rules 
defined “public lands” too narrowly by not including navigable waters 
upstream and downstream of ANILCA CSUs.86 The court reaffirmed its 
reliance on the federal reserved water rights doctrine, upholding Katie 
John I and finding that the 1999 rules were consistent with its holding.87 
C. Subsistence Management after Katie John 
The Katie John trilogy was a battle over the subsistence resource 
management regime in Alaska. However, Katie John was just one chapter 
in the history of subsistence in the state. Prior to European arrival in 1741, 
Alaska’s entire population was made up of indigenous people living a 
subsistence lifestyle.88 The survival of this lifestyle was at stake when 
ANCSA extinguished aboriginal title along with traditional hunting and 
fishing rights in Alaska in exchange for land and monetary 
compensation.89 ANILCA sought to preserve subsistence rights by 
codifying a subsistence priority for rural Alaskans in Title VIII.90 Congress 
placed primary responsibility for implementing this priority in the state, 
with a federal right to step in if the state did not comply with the law 
within a year.91 In anticipation of ANILCA, Alaska passed a subsistence 
 
 83.  Id. at 1047. 
 84.  720 F.3d 1214 (9th Cir. 2013).  
 85.  Id. at 1218.  
 86.  Id. at 1223.  
 87.  Id. at 1245.  
 88.  Jack B. McGee, Subsistence Hunting and Fishing in Alaska: Does ANILCA’s 
Rural Subsistence Priority Really Conflict with the Alaska Constitution? 27 ALASKA L. 
REV. 221, 223 (2010).  
 89.  Robert T. Anderson, Sovereignty and Subsistence: Native Self-Government 
and Rights to Hunt, Fish, and Gather after ANCSA, 33 ALASKA L. REV. 187, 204 (2016).  
 90.  ANILCA § 804, 94 Stat. at 2423.  
 91.  See id. § 805(d), 94 Stat. at 2425 (“The Secretary shall not implement 
subsections (a), (b), and (c) of this section if within one year . . . the State enacts 
and implements laws of general applicability which are consistent with . . . 
sections 803, 804, and 805, such laws, unless and until repealed, shall supersede 
such sections insofar as such sections govern State responsibility pursuant to this 
title for the taking of fish and wildlife on the public lands for subsistence uses.”).  
JONES FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 4/29/2020  5:40 PM 
232 ALASKA LAW REVIEW Vol. 36:2 
priority law in 1978, and regulations promulgated under that law brought 
Alaska into compliance with ANILCA.92 
However, Alaska’s compliance did not last. In 1989, the Alaska 
Supreme Court ruled in McDowell v. State that the state’s ANILCA-
compliant rural subsistence priority violated Article VIII, Section 3 of the 
Alaska Constitution.93 This provision guarantees that, “Wherever 
occurring in their natural state, fish, wildlife, and waters are reserved to 
the people for common use.”94 The court’s main complaint was with the 
“crude” nature of the urban-rural dichotomy as a criterion for 
establishing subsistence use.95 The court suggested “[a] classification 
scheme employing individual characteristics would be less invasive of the 
article VIII open access values and much more apt to accomplish the 
purpose of the statute . . . .”96 However, Alaska did not act to replace the 
unconstitutional rural priority with an alternative system.97 The federal 
government stepped in to administer the subsistence priority on 
ANILCA-defined public lands.98 
This system persists because Alaska has never come back into 
compliance with ANILCA. On public lands (including navigable waters 
after Katie John), the federal government administers the rural subsistence 
priority.99 The Federal Subsistence Management Board (FSMB) defines 
who is eligible for the rural subsistence priority and creates regulations 
regarding subsistence harvest.100 On non-public lands, the State of Alaska 
administers its own subsistence management program.101 The rural 
subsistence priority only applies on federally regulated waters. This 
means that subsistence users must carefully consider whose jurisdiction 
they are hunting and fishing under, imposing the costs of research and 
possible mistakes on those users. 
It is helpful to situate these subsistence programs in property law 
concepts of commons management. Both the state and federal systems 
 
 92.  Anderson, supra note 89, at 214.  
 93.  McDowell v. State, 785 P.2d 1, 9 (Alaska 1989).  
 94.  ALASKA CONST. art. VIII, § 3.  
 95.  McDowell, 785 P.2d at 10–11.  
 96.  Id. at 11.  
 97.  McGee, supra note 88, at 236.  
 98.  Id.  
 99.  U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., OFFICE OF SUBSISTENCE MGMT., 2017/2019 
FEDERAL SUBSISTENCE FISHERIES REGULATIONS 3 (effective Apr. 1, 2017–Mar. 31, 
2019), https://www.fws.gov/uploadedFiles/Region_7/NWRS/Zone_1/Tetlin/ 
PDF/2017-2019_fisheries_regulations-web_reduced.pdf.  
 100.  50 C.F.R § 100.10(a), (d) (2019); LISA MAAS, U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., 
FEDERAL SUBSISTENCE MANAGEMENT PROGRAM 1, https://www.fs.usda.gov 
/Internet/FSE_DOCUMENTS/fseprd541305.pdf (last visited Oct. 4, 2019).  
 101.  MAAS, supra note 100, at 1.  
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regulate the gear and methods that can be used for subsistence fishing.102 
These are “rightway” regulations that use technology restrictions to place 
a functional limit on the amount that can be harvested.103 By adding the 
rural subsistence priority, the federal system incorporates a “keep-out” 
regulation that restricts the number of people who can access the 
resource.104 
IV. THE STURGEON DECISIONS 
On his quest to use his hovercraft in the Yukon-Charley preserve, 
John Sturgeon went to the Supreme Court twice. Grappling with many of 
the same issues as the Ninth Circuit in the Katie John trilogy, the Court 
arrived at a final answer regarding the proper statutory interpretation of 
section 103(c). However, the Court’s solution does not resolve underlying 
tensions regarding subsistence management in Alaska. The perpetual 
push and pull between the state and the federal government will 
continue, but the Sturgeon II decision may present an opportunity for 
increased cooperation and compromise. 
A. Sturgeon I 
In 2013, the district court ruled against Sturgeon, holding that since 
none of the regulations Sturgeon challenged applied “solely” to public 
lands within ANILCA CSUs, they were not precluded by section 103(c).105 
The Court found it dispositive that the regulations applied to NPS units 
nationwide, not just in Alaska.106 This narrow interpretation left NPS free 
to regulate inholdings in ANILCA parks as long as their regulations 
applied generally to NPS property in all fifty states. The court did not 
reach the question of whether the Nation River and other navigable 
waters within CSUs were “public lands.”107 On appeal, the Ninth Circuit 
 
 102.  See ALASKA ADMIN. CODE tit. 5 § 39.105 (2019) (documenting the gear 
allowed by state law); see also U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., OFFICE OF SUBSISTENCE 
MGMT., supra note 99, at 83 (listing the allowable gear for subsistence fishing). 
 103.  Carol M. Rose, Rethinking Environmental Controls: Management Strategies 
for Common Resources, 1991 DUKE L.J. 1, 9 (1991). 
 104.  See id. (defining available methods of managing common resources).  
 105.  Sturgeon v. Masica, No. 3:11-cv-0183-HRH, 2013 WL 5888230, at *8 (D. 
Alaska Oct. 30, 2013) (“None of those regulations was adopted ‘solely’ to address 
entry upon or use of various equipment on public lands within ANILCA-created 
conservation units such as Yukon-Charley and Katmai.”).  
 106.  Id. at *9 (“[The regulations banning hovercrafts and helicopters] are 
regulations of general applicability across the entirety of the NPS.”). 
 107.  Id. at *7 (“[W]e need not decide here which if any of the correlative rights 
with respect to the navigable waters (as distinguished from submerged lands) of 
the Nation and Alagnak Rivers are owned by the State or the United States, or 
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affirmed the district court’s ruling and its interpretation of ANILCA 
section 103(c).108 Like the district court, the circuit court did not reach the 
question of whether navigable waters within CSUs were “public lands” 
for the purposes of ANILCA.109 Finally, the Supreme Court reversed the 
Ninth Circuit’s decision. Chief Justice Roberts wrote for the Court, 
rejecting the lower courts’ construction of the statute and remanding the 
case for consideration of the broader “public lands” issue.110 
B. The Ninth Circuit’s Ruling 
On remand, the Ninth Circuit finally reached the central issue of 
whether navigable waters are included in “public lands” under 
ANILCA.111 By the time the court decided this iteration of the section 
103(c) issue, the competing interests and interpretations had been 
thoroughly hashed out in the Katie John decisions. Nonetheless, the court 
performed its own analysis of the role section 103(c) plays in the ANILCA 
system, finding that ANILCA contemplates at least some NPS interest in 
non-public lands.112 Judge Nguyen concluded that the Katie John cases 
were binding and decided the issue based on the federal government’s 
interest in the federal reserved waters doctrine.113 
While the Ninth Circuit’s holding was relatively straightforward, 
there are two additional aspects of the opinion that are worth 
highlighting. First, the court recognized the importance of having a 
consistent definition of “public lands” throughout ANILCA.114 Second, 
Judge Nguyen took the unusual step of authoring an opinion concurring 
with her own majority opinion, characterizing the result as 
“unfortunate.”115 The concurring opinion echoes the critiques of Katie John 
 
whether such interests are or are not public land.”).  
 108.  Sturgeon v. Masica, 768 F.3d 1066, 1077 (9th Cir. 2014) (“In short, then, the 
hovercraft ban is not one that ‘appli[es] solely to public lands within [CSUs]’ in 
Alaska.”).  
 109.  Id. at 1077–78 (“[E]ven assuming (without deciding) that the waters of and 
lands beneath the Nation River have been ‘conveyed to the State’ for purposes of 
§ 103(c), that subsection does not preclude the application and enforcement of the 
NPS regulation at issue.”).  
 110.  Sturgeon v. Frost, 136 S. Ct. 1061, 1072 (2016).  
 111.  Sturgeon v. Frost, 872 F.3d 927 (9th Cir. 2017).  
 112.  See id. at 932 (“ANILCA recognizes that the federal government retains 
an interest in at least some otherwise non-public lands.”).  
 113.  Id. at 934 (“We are bound under our Katie John precedent to reach a similar 
conclusion here.”).  
 114.  Id. (“It would be anomalous if we treated the regulation at issue in Katie 
John III regarding the geographic scope of regulations implementing Title VIII as 
employing a different construction of ‘public lands’ than applicable elsewhere in 
ANILCA.”) (internal citations omitted).  
 115.  Id. at 937 (Nguyen, J., concurring).  
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that were present throughout the original litigation. According to Judge 
Nguyen: 
A reserved water right is the right to a sufficient volume of water 
for use in an appropriate federal purpose. This case has nothing 
to do with that. Rather, it is about the right to regulate navigation 
on navigable waters within an Alaska national preserve. That is 
a Commerce Clause interest and should be analyzed as such.116 
As this critique suggests, the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Sturgeon II 
represented a microcosm of the Katie John saga. At least for Judge Nguyen, 
the Katie John precedent remained an “inherently unsatisfactory” 
resolution to a complex problem.117 
C. The Supreme Court Weighs in Again 
Sturgeon II118 finally gave the Supreme Court the opportunity to 
decide whether navigable waters in Alaska’s CSUs are “public lands” 
under ANILCA. The Court took the opportunity to overturn the Ninth 
Circuit’s holding and to reject its approach to the problem. Writing for the 
Court, Justice Kagan began from the premise that federal reserved water 
rights are usufructuary and do not confer title in the traditional sense.119 
The Court found this fact decisive with regard to the “public lands” 
question. Reflecting on the Katie John decisions, this approach brings to 
mind Judge Kozinski’s textualist dissent in Katie John II.120 The Court’s 
conclusion bars enforcement of NPS regulations in Alaska CSUs’ 
navigable waters. Justice Kagan points out that the Court’s holding is 
consistent with ANILCA’s “grand bargain” because it “provide[s] an 
‘assurance’ that [inholding owners] would not be subject to all the 
regulatory constraints placed on neighboring federal properties.”121 This 
conclusion also offers a reading of ANILCA that is consistent with 
traditional conceptions of federal water law.122 On its surface, the Court’s 
resolution of Sturgeon II is a cut and dried construction of ANILCA, but 
two additional factors complicate the matter. 
First, Justice Sotomayor filed a concurring opinion joined by Justice 
 
 116.  Id. (Nguyen, J., concurring) (internal citations omitted).  
 117.  See Alaska v. Babbit, 72 F.3d 698, 704 (9th Cir. 1995) (recognizing that the 
holding in Katie John I is frustrating because of the administrative burden and 
potential confusion it creates).  
 118.  Sturgeon v. Frost, 139 S. Ct. 1066 (2019).  
 119.  Id. at 1079.  
 120.  John v. United States, 247 F.3d 1032, 1047 (9th Cir. 2001) (per curiam) 
(Kozinski, J., concurring 
 121.  Sturgeon, 139 S. Ct. at 1084. 
 122.  FPC v. Niagara Mohawk Power Corp., 347 U.S. 239, 247 n.10 (1954).  
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Ginsburg that takes issue with the presumed implications of the 
majority’s holding. On narrow statutory construction grounds, Justice 
Sotomayor agrees that navigable waters are not public lands under 
ANILCA. 123 However, Justice Sotomayor dove headlong into two sources 
of NPS authority the majority did not discuss. The most significant of 
these is the authority to regulate out-of-park areas when it is necessary 
and proper to protect in-park areas.124 Here, this authority would allow 
NPS to regulate on navigable waters where it is necessary and proper to 
uphold the purposes of a CSU. 
Justice Sotomayor is confident that this power exists and can be 
exercised in Alaska because “Congress must have intended for the Park 
Service to have at least some authority over navigable waters within 
Alaska’s parks.”125 She calls upon several examples of ANILCA’s focus 
on “rivers and river systems.”126 This argument is compelling because it 
seems unlikely that Congress would call upon NPS to, for instance, 
“maintain the environmental integrity of the Charley River basin, 
including streams, lakes and other natural features”127 if the NPS has no 
authority to regulate navigable waters in CSUs.128 This argument leaves 
open the possibility that NPS could reassert regulations like the 
hovercraft ban by citing its out-of-park authority. 
Second, the Court in Sturgeon II avoids fully addressing the Katie John 
trilogy. In a footnote, citing to the briefs of the State of Alaska and the 
Ahtna Native Alaskan corporation, the Court says that ANILCA’s 
subsistence fishing provisions are “not at issue in this case.”129 As such, 
the Court “do[es] not disturb the Ninth Circuit’s holdings that the Park 
Service may regulate subsistence fishing on navigable waters.”130 Though 
the Court does not belabor this point, its holding means that “public 
lands” has different meanings in different parts of ANILCA.131 As 
addressed below, this inconsistency poses challenges for regulatory 
consistency. 
 
 123.  Sturgeon, 139 S. Ct. at 1088 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).  
 124.  Id. 
 125.  Id. at 1089.  
 126.  Id.  
 127.  16 U.S.C. § 410hh(10) (2018).  
 128.  Sturgeon, 139 S. Ct. 1066, 1089 (2019) (Sotomayor, J., concurring). 
 129.  Id. at 1080 n.2.  
 130.  Id.  
 131.  See id. at 1079–80,1082 (defining “public lands” to mean lands where the 
federal government holds title to a reserve water right and to mean any federally 
owned land).  
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V. RESPONSES TO STURGEON 
A. Alaska’s Response to Increased Sovereignty 
The State of Alaska’s reaction to Sturgeon II was overwhelmingly 
positive. The state has long viewed the turf war over navigable waters in 
CSUs as an issue of sovereignty.132 Governor Dunleavy released an 
effusive statement praising the ruling and saying, “Today’s ruling 
represents an important moment for Alaska’s sovereignty and the rule of 
law.”133 Department of Fish and Game Commissioner Doug Vincent-Lang 
was equally pleased because “[Alaska’s] waterways are our lifeblood. 
Management authority impacts fishing, hunting, transportation and 
economic development—all the things Alaskans hold dear. With this 
decision the state can continue to do what it does best: manage Alaska’s 
resources for the benefit of all Alaskans.”134 Clearly, the state views the 
decision as a win and is happy to take on more influence over CSUs. 
Alaska’s federal lawmakers also supported the decision and 
congratulated Sturgeon on his victory.135 Senator Lisa Murkowski was 
careful to specify that she appreciated the Court’s refusal to overturn the 
Katie John decisions.136 The state was not specific about the implications of 
the decisions in the near term, but it seems that the provisions of the 
Alaska Administrative Code will replace NPS regulations as the 
governing law on the navigable waters in CSUs.137 
B. Alaska Native Responses 
Before the Supreme Court, the Native American Rights Fund 
(NARF) joined an amicus brief that advocated for the Katie John approach 
to be extended in Sturgeon II.138 This position was likely motivated by the 
 
 132.  See Press Release, Alaska Dep’t of Law, U.S. Supreme Court Agrees to 
Hear Sturgeon Case on Alaska Water Rights (June 18, 2018) (“The State will 
continue to defend our sovereign rights and the best interests of Alaskans.”), 
http://www.law.alaska.gov/press/releases/2018/061818-Sturgeon.html.  
 133.  Press Release, Governor Michael J. Dunleavy, Supreme Court Rules 9-0 
in Favor of John Sturgeon and Alaska’s Rights (Mar. 26, 2019), 
https://gov.alaska.gov/newsroom/2019/03/26/supreme-court-rules-9-0-in-
favor-of-john-sturgeon-and-alaskas-rights/.  
 134.  Id.  
 135.  Press Release, Senator Lisa Murkowski, Alaska Congressional Delegation 




 136.  Id.  
 137.  See Governor Michael J. Dunleavy, supra note 133.  
 138.  Brief for Alaska Native Subsistence Users as Amici Curiae Supporting 
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desire to maintain the hard-won victories of Alaska Natives and 
subsistence users through the Katie John litigation. Though the Supreme 
Court rejected the arguments advanced by NARF, the Alaska Native 
responses to the Supreme Court’s ruling in Sturgeon II have been widely 
positive.139 
The Alaska Federation of Natives (AFN) released a statement 
praising the Sturgeon decision, saying the organization viewed the ruling 
“favorably.”140 The Court’s decision to leave the Katie John decisions 
undisturbed was especially important to AFN.141 Ahtna, a Native Alaskan 
corporation, also approved of the decision despite filing an amicus brief 
that did not reflect the Court’s ultimate conclusion.142 
While Alaska Native reactions to Katie John precedent’s survival 
were positive, they recognized that challenges remain. AFN said, “The 
real problem of dual federal-state management of Alaska’s fish and game 
resources remains unsolved.”143 
C. Parks Service 
The NPS response to the Sturgeon II ruling has been muted thus far. 
Immediately following the ruling, the NPS said it was “determin[ing] 
what changes will be necessary to bring existing policy in line with 
today’s ruling.”144 The National Parks Conservation Association, a 
nonprofit group focused on preserving national parks, voiced more 
disappointment.145 Though NPS has not said as much, the Sturgeon 
decision does leave the federal government in something of a 
conundrum. As Justice Sotomayor pointed out in concurrence, ANILCA 
 
Respondents, Sturgeon v. Frost, 139 S. Ct. 1066 (2019) (No. 17-949).  
 139.  AFN Responds to Supreme Court’s Decision on Sturgeon Case, THE DELTA 
DISCOVERY, Apr. 3, 2019, https://deltadiscovery.com/afn-responds-to-supreme-
courts-decision-on-sturgeon-case/.  
 140.  Id.  
 141.  Id.  
 142.  Press Release, Ahtna, Inc., Ahtna Issues Statement in Response to U.S. 
Supreme Court Sturgeon Decision (Mar. 26, 2019), https://www.ahtna-
inc.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/03/2019-AHTNA-MEDIA-
RELEASE_Sturgeon-Decision_FINAL.pdf.  
 143.  AFN Responds to Supreme Court’s Decision on Sturgeon Case, supra note 139.  
 144.  Zaz Hollander, Supreme Court Backs Alaska Moose Hunter Over Park Service 
but Steers Clear of Katie John, ANCHORAGE DAILY NEWS, Mar. 26, 2019, 
https://www.adn.com/outdoors-adventure/2019/03/26/supreme-court-
backs-alaska-moose-hunter-over-park-service-in-broad-ruling-on-jurisdiction/.  
 145.  Press Release, Nat’l Parks Conservation Ass’n, Supreme Court Ruling 
Green-Lights Hovercraft Use in Alaska National Park (Mar. 26, 2019), 
https://www.npca.org/articles/2135-supreme-court-ruling-green-lights-
hovercraft-use-in-alaska-national-park.  
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calls on NPS to preserve many of the rivers in CSUs.146 This task will be 
difficult if not impossible with only the authority to control the lands 
surrounding those waters. The approach NPS takes to solving this puzzle 
will have important implications for the future of Alaska resource 
management. 
Jim Adams, the regional director of the NPS in Alaska, seemed 
willing to pursue the alternative regulatory routes offered in the 
Sotomayor concurrence.147 He commented that opinion “makes it clear 
that the park service still has the authority to protect park lands from 
resource damage.”148 At the same time, he recognized the Sturgeon II 
decision as an opportunity for collaboration, saying “[the ruling] give[s] 
the Park Service a voice in management of the river and it gives the state 
a voice in management of the river [a]nd the challenge and the 
opportunity the agencies have now moving forward is to work 
together.”149 
This spirit of cooperation is key if the issues left open following the 
Sturgeon II opinion are to be resolved. The NPS could attempt to reinstate 
all or most of their existing regulations under the authorities suggested in 
the Sotomayor opinion. However, this recalcitrant approach would 
almost certainly lead to more litigation, prolonging a courtroom battle 
that has lasted almost a decade already. As AFN Subsistence Committee 
Chairman Tom Tilden noted, “Litigation is no place to solve our resource 
management problems.”150 
VI. LIFE AFTER STURGEON II 
A. Vulnerability of Katie John Precedent 
While the Supreme Court “d[id] not disturb”151 the Katie John trilogy 
in its Sturgeon II opinion, it is not entirely clear where the Katie John cases 
stand in a post-Sturgeon world. On one hand, it seems that the Court 
adopted the State of Alaska’s assertion that “public lands” should mean 
something different in subsistence and non-subsistence contexts.152 On 
the other hand, the Supreme Court adopted an unambiguous definition 
 
 146.  Sturgeon v. Frost, 139 S. Ct. 1066, 1089 (2019) (Sotomayor, J., concurring). 
 147.  Nat’l Parks Conservation Ass’n, supra note 145.  
 148.  Id.  
 149.  Lauren Maxwell, ‘Our Parks are Different:’ Sturgeon Hails Supreme 
Court Ruling, KTVA, Mar. 26, 2019, https://www.ktva.com/story/40200421/ 
our-parks-are-different-sturgeon-hails-supreme-court-ruling.  
 150.  AFN Responds to Supreme Court’s Decision on Sturgeon Case, supra note 139. 
 151.  Sturgeon, 139 S. Ct. at 1080 n.2 (2019).  
 152.  See id. 
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of “public lands” that repudiates the Katie John Courts’ approach.153 At the 
very least, the Sturgeon and Katie John cases coexist uneasily. Their 
apparent conflict adds another layer of complication to the regulation of 
navigable waters in CSUs. The federal government lacks the power to 
impose NPS regulations on those waters under the Sturgeon II decision 
but is required to regulate subsistence and uphold the rural subsistence 
priority under Katie John and Title VIII of ANILCA.154 This situation 
further blurs the line between federal and state authority. Any judicial 
solution to this problem will be fraught with thorny issues. 
B. Potential Judicial Solutions 
1. The End of Katie John 
One route for the courts would be to do away with the Katie John 
doctrine. This approach would be consistent with the Sturgeon majority’s 
implication that the federal reserved waters doctrine does not customarily 
confer “title.”155 ANILCA initially assigned primary responsibility for 
subsistence management to the states, so state management would also 
be consonant with the statute.156 However, state management would run 
squarely into the state constitutional law issues that led to federal 
management in the first place.157 Without a state constitutional 
amendment or reinterpretation of McDowell, a state-run subsistence 
management system would remain noncompliant with ANILCA.158 
2. The Imperfect Status Quo 
Another path would be to continue defining “public lands” 
differently with regard to subsistence use and non-subsistence 
management. This appears to be the state of affairs after Sturgeon II.159 The 
legal viability of this interpretation relies on the ability to interpret a 
statutorily defined term differently in separate contexts within the same 
statutory scheme. The leading cases establishing this principle, cited by 
the State of Alaska in Sturgeon, concern the use of broad terms (i.e. “air 
pollutant”).160 These kinds of terms lend themselves to flexible 
 
 153.  Id. at 1076–77. 
 154.  Id. at 1084–85. 
 155.  See id. at 1079 (“[T]he more common understanding . . . is that ‘reserved 
water rights are not the type of property interests to which title can be held’ . . . .”) 
(quoting Totemoff v. State, 905 P.2d 954, 965 (Alaska 1995)). 
 156.  ANILCA § 805(d), 94 Stat. at 2424.  
 157.  McDowell v. State, 785 P.2d 1, 9 (Alaska 1989).  
 158.  See id.  
 159.  See generally Sturgeon, 139 S. Ct. 1066 (2019).  
 160.  See Envtl. Def. v. Duke Energy Corp., 549 U.S. 561, 574 (2007) (“A given 
term in the same statute may take on distinct characters from association with 
distinct statutory objects calling for different implementation strategies. The point 
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interpretation.  In addition, the structure of a comprehensive statute 
largely implemented by one agency provides a hospitable environment 
for some internal inconsistency. When the Environmental Protection 
Agency defines the term “air pollutant” to include greenhouse gases in 
one Clean Air Act context, but excludes them in another, the agency can 
work internally to ensure this difference does not create confusion. 
The navigable waters in ANILCA CSUs present different 
considerations. The costs to administrability will likely be higher where 
the statutory term in question (i.e. “public lands”) is decisive as to 
whether the state or federal government has jurisdiction. Defining “public 
lands” differently within ANILCA subjects the same navigable waters to 
two regulatory authorities. The deciding factor would be subsistence 
management, federally regulated under the Katie John definition, and 
non-subsistence management, regulated by the State under the Sturgeon 
II definition.161 
While these two regimes might not directly contradict each other, 
their separate goals could lead to conflict. The federal subsistence 
management program strives to preserve resources for subsistence use by 
rural Alaskans.162 The State of Alaska administers its programs to 
promote open access.163 These goals seem primed to lead to continued 
federal-state tension. Further, NPS regulations will no longer apply on the 
CSU navigable waters that the federal government will still manage for 
subsistence.164 To the extent that NPS regulations implicitly supported 
subsistence use, perhaps by prohibiting access by means such as 
 
is the same even when the terms share a common statutory definition, if it is 
general enough . . . .”). 
 161.  See John v. United States, 720 F.3d 1214, 1241 (9th Cir. 2013) (“[F]ederally 
reserved water rights may be enforced to implement ANILCA’s rural subsistence 
priority as to waters within and ‘immediately adjacent to’ federal reservations, 
but not as to waters upstream and downstream from those reservations. . . . [T]he 
federal reserved water rights doctrine might apply upstream and downstream 
from reservations in some circumstances, were there a particularized enforcement 
action for that quantity of water needed to preserve subsistence use in a given 
reservation, where such use is a primary purpose for which the reservation was 
established.”); Sturgeon v. Frost, 139 S. Ct. 1066, 1080 n.2 (2019) (holding that 
navigable waters within ANILCA CSUs are non-public lands subject to local 
control, but leaving the federal subsistence management regime intact). 
 162.  See ANILCA §§ 801–16, 94 Stat. at 2422–2430 (1980) (establishing the 
subsistence priority).] 
 163.  See ALASKA CONST. art. VIII, §§ 1, 3 (providing for open access to Alaska’s 
land and waters).  
 164.  See Sturgeon, 139 S. Ct. at 1087 (2019) (“But [non-public lands] did not 
become subject to new regulation by the happenstance of ending up within a 
national park. In those areas, Section 103(c) makes clear, Park Service 
administration does not replace local control.”); see also 36 C.F.R §§ 2.1–2.62 
(regulating activities in National Parks).  
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hovercrafts, that synergy will no longer exist.165 
Each of these judicial solutions, including the status quo, leaves 
serious questions unanswered. None of them is ideal. In the short term, 
both the state and NPS have the opportunity push their positions 
aggressively in the courts. The State could attack the Katie John decisions, 
using Sturgeon II as ammunition. Likewise, NPS could seize on the 
Sotomayor concurrence to assert out-of-park authority and reinstate 
regulations on CSU navigable waters that the State would surely 
challenge. Either of these approaches would likely entail protracted 
litigation. This battle would be unlikely to result in the best solution for 
either party. It is time for a truce in the ANILCA jurisdiction wars. 
VII. COOPERATIVE MANAGEMENT AS A POLICY SOLUTION 
If the courts are not the place to find a solution for ANILCA’s 
jurisdictional problems, the state and federal governments, along with 
Alaska Native stakeholders, will have to work together to solve their 
problems. The most promising avenue to reach a satisfactory outcome for 
all parties, allowing for subsistence use, conservation, and state 
sovereignty, is cooperative management. The State has called for greater 
cooperation with the federal government across a range of resource 
management issues.166 The Department of the Interior has also expressed 
a desire to be a better “neighbor” to the states by engaging in collaborative 
management.167 ANILCA provides several opportunities for this kind of 
cooperation, including conservation and management plans,168 the 
Alaska Land Use Council (ALUC),169 and approval of memoranda of 
understanding.170 Cooperative efforts between the federal and state 
governments could lead to further synchronization of subsistence 
management. Ultimately, these efforts could prompt substantive changes 
in state law that would allow for the ANILCA compliant state subsistence 
management the law’s framers envisioned. 
 
 165.  See 36 C.F.R. § 3.8(a)(1) (prohibiting the use of airboats).  
 166.  Letter from Doug Vincent-Lang, Acting Comm’r, Alaska Dep’t of Fish & 
Game, to David Bernhardt, Deputy Comm’r, Dep’t of the Interior (Jan. 2, 2019), 
https://www.peer.org/assets/docs/ak/1_8_19_Transmittal_ltr.pdf (transmittal 
letter); see also Attachment to Letter from Doug Vincent-Lang, (Jan. 2, 2019), 
https://www.peer.org/assets/docs/ak/1_8_19_Full_list_demands.pdf 
(attachments).  
 167.  JASON HAYES, MACKINACK CTR. FOR PUB. POLICY, CONFLICT TO 
COOPERATION: COLLABORATIVE MANAGEMENT OF FEDERAL LANDS IN MICHIGAN 11–
12 (2018), https://www.mackinac.org/archives/2018/s2018-07.pdf.  
 168.  ANILCA § 1301, 94 Stat. at 2472–73 (1980).  
 169.  Id. § 1201.  
 170.  Id. § 809.  
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A. Conservation and Management Plans 
Section 1301 of ANILCA requires the preparation of conservation 
and management plans for each ANILCA National Park and preserve 
within five years.171 Section 304(g)(1) requires a comprehensive 
conservation plan for each national refuge.172 These requirements 
prompted a deluge of planning after the Act’s passage that limited the 
capacity for meaningful participation by sheer scale.173 While NPS has 
updated some of these plans,174 others, including the conservation and 
management plan for the Yukon-Charley Rivers National Preserve, have 
not been updated since their publication in the 1980s.175 More than thirty 
years later, the time is ripe to revisit these plans. Sturgeon II gives the state 
expanded sovereignty over rivers that the federal government is required 
to conserve under ANILCA.176 This expanded sovereignty calls for 
increased coordination with the federal government. Reopening the 
management plan process for updates offers a perfect opportunity for 
state, federal, and Alaska Native stakeholders to be heard through the 
notice and comment process. 
Rather than enacting regulations directly, the federal government 
can seek to reach their goals through state policy. For instance, the State 
has the capacity to enact common sense regulations on the kinds of 
vessels can be used on CSU rivers.177 If the State implements such policies, 
both the conservation and state sovereignty aspects of ANILCA can be 
fully realized. These kinds of compromises have the potential to grow 
from the management plan process. The NPS should adopt a policy of 
systematically reviewing and reopening the management plans for the 
CSUs in Alaska over the next ten years, beginning with those that have 
not been revisited since their publication. 
 
 171.  Id. § 1301.  
 172.  Id. § 304(g)(1).  
 173.  Thomas J. Gallagher, Native Participation in Land Management Planning in 
Alaska, 41 ARCTIC 91, 94 (1989).  
 174.  See, e.g., NAT’L PARK SERV., CONSOLIDATED MANAGEMENT PLAN FOR DENALI 
NATIONAL PARK (last updated 2006), https://www.nps.gov/dena/learn/ 
management/upload/GMP-Consolidated-Final.pdf.  
 175.  See, e.g., NAT’L PARK SERV., YUKON-CHARLEY RIVERS NATIONAL PRESERVE 
GENERAL MANAGEMENT PLAN (1985), https://parkplanning.nps.gov/ 
document.cfm?parkID=22&projectID=34502&documentID=3808.  
 176.  See e.g., ANILCA § 202(2) (“The monument addition and preserve shall 
be managed . . . to maintain unimpaired the water habitat for significant salmon 
populations . . . .”).  
 177.  See ALASKA ADMIN. CODE tit. 11, § 20.860(b) (2019) (limiting the power of 
motors allowed in the Kenai River Special Management Area to 50 horsepower).  
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B. Reviving ALUC 
ANILCA established ALUC to provide a forum for federal agencies, 
state government, and Alaska Native interests to collaborate and voice 
their opinions on issues regarding land management in Alaska.178 ALUC 
was comprised of a presidential appointee, the Governor of Alaska, the 
Alaska office heads of several federal agencies including NPS and FWS, 
and two representatives selected by Alaska Native corporations.179 The 
Council did not have much in the way of regulatory authority; its main 
function was to make recommendations to the state and federal 
governments.180 However, ALUC did convene a representative body that 
included many of the major parties concerned with Alaska land 
management.181 The Council also recommended cooperative planning 
zones where “the management of lands or resources by one member 
materially affects the management of lands or resources by another . . . 
.”182 This kind of body could work to facilitate collaboration that would 
alleviate some of the remaining federal-state tensions in the wake of 
Sturgeon II. 
Unfortunately, ANILCA included a sunset provision that disbanded 
ALUC after ten years absent congressional action.183 Reconstituting 
ALUC would be timely, because a state body that performed a similar 
function, the Citizens Advisory Council on Federal Areas, recently lost 
state funding.184 In 2016, Alaska Senator Lisa Murkowski introduced a bill 
that would reinvigorate ALUC.185 State leaders like Senator John Coghill 
have also called for a ALUC’s revival.186 Bringing back the Council would 
not be a panacea. Its predecessor was plagued by the state-federal 
competition that pervades Alaska land management.187 However, ALUC 
at least creates a forum where collaboration can happen and compromises 
must be made. Perhaps Sturgeon II could present an opportunity for a new 
ALUC to designate cooperative management areas around navigable 
 
 178.  ANILCA § 1201. 
 179.  Id.  
 180.  Id.  
 181.  See id. § 1201(c) (specifying membership of ALUC to include 
representatives from federal and state organizations, and Alaska Native 
corporations). 
 182.  Id. § 1201(j)(1).  
 183.  Id. § 1210(l).  
 184.  Sam Friedman, Gov. Walker’s Budget Veto Closes State Federal Overreach 
Panel, FAIRBANKS DAILY NEWS-MINER, July 2, 2016, http://www.newsminer.com/ 
news/local_news/gov-walker-s-budget-veto-closes-state-federal-overreach-
panel/article_fb6cb850-40f2-11e6-9cc7-a36712131ef4.html.  
 185.  Alaska Land Use Planning Act, S. 3005, 114th Cong. (2016).  
 186.  Friedman, supra note 184. 
 187.  Gallagher, supra note 173, at 93. 
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waters. This could help both parties meet their goals. While it would 
require an act of Congress, reinstating ALUC would be a step in the right 
direction for cooperative management in Alaska CSUs. 
C. Memoranda of Understanding 
Section 809 of ANILCA authorizes cooperative subsistence 
management plans by saying, “The Secretary may enter into cooperative 
agreements or otherwise cooperate with other Federal agencies, the State, 
Native Corporations, other appropriate persons and organizations . . . to 
effectuate the purposes and policies of this [title].”188 These agreements 
take the form of memoranda of understanding (MOUs) between the 
federal government and other interested parties.189 In the past, the Federal 
Subsistence Management Board operated under an MOU with the State 
of Alaska that provided an outline of federal-state relations in subsistence 
management.190 However, this MOU expired.191 Efforts to revive the 
MOU commenced in 2016, but they do not seem to have resulted in a final 
agreement.192 A new MOU would normalize federal-state relations and 
make coordinating with other parties easier.193 
Beyond federal-state relations, MOUs for subsistence co-
management between the federal government and Alaska Native groups 
has seen some success. A Memorandum of Agreement between the 
Department of Interior and the Ahtna Native Corporation allows for 
greater Alaska Native input regarding moose and caribou hunting and 
 
 188.  ANILCA § 809. 
 189.  See, e.g., Memorandum of Agreement Between United States Department 
of the Interior and Ahtna Inter-Tribal Resource Commission for a Demonstration 
Project for Cooperative Management of Customary and Traditional Subsistence 
Uses in the Ahtna Region (2016), https://www.doi.gov/sites/doi.gov 
/files/uploads/ahtna_doi_moa_with_signature_pages_final.pdf. (citing 
ANILCA as supporting authority for a wildlife management partnership between 
the United States Department of the Interior and the Ahtna Inter-Tribal Resource 
Commission).  
 190.  FED. SUBSISTENCE MGMT. BD., PUB. MEETING MATERIALS JANUARY 10-12, 
2017 at 130, https://www.doi.gov/sites/doi.gov/files/uploads/ 
jan_2017_fsb_meeting_book_smallest.pdf.  
 191.  Joaqlin Estus, Federal Subsistence Board Votes to Mend Alaska Relations, 
ALASKA PUBLIC MEDIA, Jan. 19, 2016, https://www.alaskapublic.org/ 
2016/01/19/federal-subsistence-board-to-seek-agreement-with-state/. 
 192.  Letter from Tim Towarak, Chair, Fed Subsistence Mgmt.t Bd., to Ted 
Spraker and Tom Kluberton, Chairmen, Alaska Dep’t of Fish and Game Bds. 
Support Section (Mar. 1, 2016), http://www.adfg.alaska.gov/static/ 
regulations/regprocess/gameboard/pdfs/2015-2016/work_session/fsb.pdf.  
 193.  See Estus, supra note 191 (“[W]e’re not going to do much better to bring in 
a third party when the first two parties aren’t necessarily in alignment or 
agreement . . . .”) (quoting Daniel Sharp, Subsistence Coordinator, Alaska Office, 
BLM).  
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began the process of allowing the Ahtna Commission to administer hunts 
for tribal members under the Federal Subsistence Management 
Program.194 In the fisheries context, FWS has entered an MOU with the 
Kuskokwim River Inter-Tribal Fish Commission.195 The MOU provides 
for consultation with the Commission before FWS makes decisions about 
the Kuskokwim salmon fishery.196 These MOUs have promise as tools for 
increased cooperation and show a willingness on the federal 
government’s part to work with stakeholders.197 However, these MOUs 
do not include the State of Alaska, largely because the State cannot 
allocate resources to one subgroup of Alaskans.198 
The Federal Subsistence Board and the State could leverage the 
section 809 MOU process in two ways to alleviate the tensions between 
federal and state subsistence management systems. First, while the rural 
subsistence priority remains an intractable problem between the state and 
federal government, a new MOU could synchronize the “rightway” 
regulations in the federal and state systems. For instance, it makes little 
sense to have differing regulations of fishing gear in the federal and state 
systems.199 This level of coordination would reduce the level of 
inconsistency between the two regulatory regimes. Second, the federal 
 
 194.  See Memorandum of Agreement Between United States Department of 
the Interior and Ahtna Inter-Tribal Resource Commission for a Demonstration 
Project for Cooperative Management of Customary and Traditional Subsistence 
Uses in the Ahtna Region (2016), https://www.doi.gov/sites/doi.gov 
/files/uploads/ahtna_doi_moa_with_signature_pages_final.pdf (“This MOA 
formalizes an agreement for the purpose of establishing a process and structure 
as a demonstration project within the Federal Subsistence Management Program 
that provides the AITRC with authority to cooperatively manage, within 
parameters established by the Board, certain aspects of subsistence hunting on 
Federal public lands by rural residents who are members of the eight federally 
recognized tribes in the Ahtna region.”); see also Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of the 
Interior, Interior and Ahtna Intertribal Resource Commission Agree to 
Cooperative Wildlife Demonstration Project (Nov. 29, 2016), 
https://www.doi.gov/pressreleases/interior-and-ahtna-intertribal-resource-
commission-agree-cooperative-wildlife (announcing “a cooperative wildlife 
management demonstration project on federal and Ahtna Corporation lands”).  
 195.  Memorandum of Understanding Between the United States Department 
of the Interior U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service Alaska Region and Kuskokwim River 
Inter-Tribal Fish Commission (2016), https://www.doi.gov/sites/ 
doi.gov/files/uploads/kuskokwin_mou_final.pdf.  
 196.  Charles Enoch, KRITFC Signs an MOU With USFWS, KYUK, (May 24, 
2016), http://www.kyuk.org/post/kritfc-signs-mou-usfws.  
 197.  Chris McDevitt, Equitable Co-Management on the Kuskokwim River 94 
(Aug. 2018) (unpublished Master’s thesis, University of Alaska-Fairbanks), 
https://scholarworks.alaska.edu/handle/11122/9676.  
 198.  Id. at 90.  
 199.  Compare 50 C.F.R. § 100.27 (2019) (detailing federal gear requirements for 
subsistence fishing), with 5 ALASKA ADMIN. CODE tit. 5, § 39.105 (2019) (detailing 
state gear requirements for subsistence fishing). 
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government should continue to use the MOU process to offer a new 
avenue for Alaska Native participation in policymaking. Though these 
MOUs only affect federal subsistence management, they produce models 
that could improve both federal and state policy in the future, especially 
if state subsistence law undergoes changes. 
D. Potential State Level Changes 
The State of Alaska could take on the entirety of the subsistence 
management program if it became compliant with the ANILCA Title VIII 
subsistence priority. Compliance would end the awkward situation of 
dual jurisdiction over navigable waters that seems to be the most likely 
outcome of the Sturgeon II decision. There are three options open for 
coming into compliance: 1) the Alaska Supreme Court overturns 
McDowell and the State implements a rural priority, 2) the Alaska 
Legislature passes a law that effectuates the rural priority without relying 
on the distinction struck down in McDowell, or 3) Alaska passes a state 
constitutional amendment making the rural subsistence priority a 
constitutional right, or at least permissible. 
The judicial route is unlikely. The equal access provisions of the 
Alaska Constitution are clear.200 And in recent cases, the Alaska Supreme 
Court has maintained its rigid interpretation of those clauses even as it 
rules in favor of some community hunting and fishing rights. In Alaska 
Fish & Wildlife Fund v. State,201 the court upheld a program that allowed 
“community harvest permits” for “groups following a hunting pattern 
similar to the one traditionally practiced by members of the Ahtna Tene 
Nene’ community . . . .”202 However, in the same decision, the court 
affirmed that “[the equal access provisions] ‘share at least one meaning: 
exclusive or special privileges to take fish and wildlife are prohibited.’”203 
The court has also allowed for the designation of fisheries as 
“subsistence” fisheries where nonsubsistence use can be curtailed in 
times of scarcity.204 However, this designation does not limit the fisheries’ 
 
 200. See ALASKA CONST. art. VIII, § 3 (“Wherever occurring in their natural state, 
fish, wildlife, and waters are reserved to the people for common use.”); see also id. 
§15 (“No exclusive right or special privilege of fishery shall be created or 
authorized in the natural waters of the State. . . .”); see also id. § 17 (“Laws and 
regulations governing the use or disposal of natural resources shall apply equally 
to all persons similarly situated with reference to the subject matter and purpose 
to be served by the law or regulation.”).  
 201.  Alaska Fish & Wildlife Conservation Fund v. State, 347 P.3d 97 (Alaska 
2015).  
 202.  Id. at 100.  
 203.  Id. at 102 (quoting McDowell v. State, 785 P.2d 1, 6 (Alaska 1989)).  
 204.  Alaska Fish & Wildlife Conservation Fund v. State Dep’t of Fish and 
Game, 289 P.3d 903, 910 (Alaska 2012). 
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use to rural residents, but rather to use by any Alaskan who is fishing for 
subsistence.205 These cases demonstrate that while there is some flexibility 
in how subsistence is regulated at the state level, the Alaska Supreme 
Court has shown no inclination to revisit the urban-rural distinction 
struck down in McDowell. 
As the law stands now, the State likely cannot recognize the 
ANILCA rural subsistence priority because of the McDowell precedent.206 
However, even in McDowell, the court recognized that another criterion 
might be specific enough to allow for an ANILCA compliant system that 
passed state constitutional muster.207 Several efforts to do so arose in the 
aftermath of the decision.208 At least one scholar has suggested that 
ANILCA’s subsistence priority does not in fact restrict subsistence use to 
only rural residents; thus, the State of Alaska could thread the needle to 
create a complex tiered system of priority that satisfies ANILCA and the 
equal access provisions.209 This kind of system is theoretically possible, 
but its implementation would likely be difficult as a practical matter. In 
addition, it would be difficult to determine ex ante whether the Alaska 
Supreme Court would in fact uphold a new subsistence priority system. 
A negative result in court would send the whole process back to square 
one. 
The most plausible and elegant state policy solution to bring the state 
into ANILCA compliance would be a state constitutional amendment 
guaranteeing rural Alaskan subsistence rights. Such an amendment 
would be a simple “revisory” change, meaning it could be enacted 
through a two-thirds vote of the legislature and approval by a majority of 
voters.210 More serious changes, called revisions, require a constitutional 
convention.211 This rural priority amendment would eliminate McDowell 
 
 205.  Id. at 910 (Alaska 2012).  
 206.  See McDowell, 785 P.2d at 9 (“[T]he requirement contained in the 1986 
subsistence statute, that one must reside in a rural area in order to participate in 
subsistence hunting and fishing, violates sections 3, 15, and 17 of article VIII of the 
Alaska Constitution.”).. [10.9(a)] 
 207.  See id. (“We are not called upon in this case to rule on what selection 
criteria might be constitutional. It seems appropriate, however, to note that any 
system which closes participation to some, but not all, applicants will necessarily 
create tension with article VIII.”).  
 208.  See FRANK NORRIS, ALASKA SUBSISTENCE: A NATIONAL PARK SERVICE 
MANAGEMENT HISTORY 163 (2002), https://www.nps.gov/subjects/ 
alaskasubsistence/upload/Norris_For_Web.pdf (describing legislative attempts 
to overcome the McDowell precedent).  
 209.  McGee, supra note 88, at 254.  
 210.  Letter from Bruce M. Botleho, Attorney Gen., State of Alaska and Joanne 
Grace, Assistant Attorney Gen., to Frank Rue, Alaska Dep’t of Fish & Game (Dec. 
14, 2001), http://www.law.state.ak.us/pdf/opinions/opinions_2001/01-
022_2001op1.pdf.  
 211.  Bess v. Ulmer, 985 P.2d 979, 981 (Alaska 1999).  
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as an obstacle to ANILCA compliance. This amendment would also serve 
the interest of state sovereignty. After Sturgeon II, assuming that NPS does 
not pursue aggressive out-of-park regulations, subsistence management 
will be the last area where the state does not control navigable waters in 
ANILCA CSUs. If the state became ANILCA compliant, it could take over 
this responsibility and be the sole government in control of those waters. 
This arrangement is actually the design that ANILCA set as the default, 
before McDowell forced the federal government to step in.212 The State of 
Alaska should pursue a rural subsistence priority amendment, ending the 
confusing status quo for subsistence users and solidifying state authority 
in CSU navigable waters. 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
The war over jurisdiction in Alaska’s CSUs has produced more 
confusion than clarity. Sturgeon II has the potential to be yet another battle 
in that long conflict or a turning point that leads to peace. If it is to be the 
latter, the State of Alaska and the federal government must use Sturgeon 
II to spark a more productive era of cooperation. ANILCA provides 
several means of fostering cooperative management if the parties are 
willing to use them. In addition, the state could take a major step forward 
by finding a way, likely through a constitutional amendment, to become 
compliant with Title VIII of ANILCA. This compliance would not be easy 
to achieve, but it would remove one of the major underlying issues that 




 212.  ANILCA § 805(d), 94 Stat. at 2425 (2018).  
